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FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5111

INFO RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 6267

RUFHEB/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4092

RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 5330

RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 6778

RUDKDA/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 6717

RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4937

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8254

RUFHMO/AMCONSUL MUNICH 4480

RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 4556

RUDKRP/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 6672

RUDKSA/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 5344

RUDKFMG/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 1576

RUFHJA/USMISSION USBERLIN 4652

RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 3805

RUEHYI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 7958

ZEN/AMCONSUL KRAKOW

ZEN/AMCONSUL POZNAN

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C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 12543

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EO 12056: GDS 12/24/87 (MEEHAN, FRANCIS J.) OR-M

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State Dept. review completed

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## COMBINED SECTION

TAGS; PEPR PINT PL

SUBJ: POLISH SITUATION; U.S. POLICY

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: OUR OBJECTIVE IN POST-DEC 13 POLAND SHOULD BE, AS PREVIOUSLY, TO MAXIMIZE RUSSIAN DISADVANTAGES. THE THREE LIKELY SCENARIOS FOR POLAND NOW ALL WEAKEN THE RUSSIAN POSITION, AND THE QUESTION IS WHICH IS THE MOST USEFUL FOR US? JARUZELSKI MAY ONLY BE TRANSITIONAL, WITH A HUSAK WAITING IN THE WINGS, BUT WE SHOULD NOT DISMISS THE POSSIBILITY YET THAT HE CAN BE INDUCED TO MAKE GOOD ON HIS COMMITMENT TO RETURN THE COUNTRY TO RENEWAL. WE WERE RIGHT TO ZAP HIM, BUT WE SHOULD NOW PAUSE, AND IF HE SHOWS ANY REAL SIGNS OF POLITICAL DECENCY, LET THE TIP OF THE CARROT SHOW. THIS APPROACH HAS A BEARING NOT ONLY ON POLAND, BUT ON OUR LARGER INTERESTS IN WESTERN EUROPE. END SUMMARY.

3. I SEE THE POLISH SITUATION AS IT HAS NOW DEVELOPED FROM WHAT I ASSUME IS THE ABIDING US NATIONAL INTEREST IN THE AREA -- TO WEAKEN THE RUSSIAN POSITION IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE. THAT INTEREST LIES BEHIND OUR POLICY APPROACH TO THE ENTIRE AREA, NOT JUST TO POLAND. IT IS THE MOTIVATION OF DIFFERENTIATION AS BETWEEN RUSSIA'S EAST-CENTRAL EUROPEAN CLIENTS. WE SEEK TO USE THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THESE STATES, WHICH INTERESTS CONTINUE UNDER COMMUNIST LEADERS OF VARIOUS STRIPES, IN ORDER TO CREATE AN WIDEN GAPS BETWEEN THEM AND MOSCOW AND DRAW THEM BACK INTO MORE NATURAL PATTERS, OF TIES WITH THE WEST. RESPECTABLE ARGUMENTS CAN BE MADE ON BOTH SIDES AS TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS POLICY. I COME DOWN ON THE SIDE THAT IT IS EFFECTIVE. IT IS AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTORY FACTOR, TO TAKE THE CASE IN POINT, TO THE DEVELOPMENTS WHICH PRODUCED THE POLISH PHENOMENON OF THE PAST YEAR AND A HALF.

4. PRE-DEC 13 POLAND WEAKENED THE RUSSIAN POSITION IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE GRAVELY. THE QUESTION THAT WE HAVE TO CONSIDER NOW IS HOW BEST TO PLAY THE POST-DEC 13 SITUATION SO AS TO FURTHER OUR ABIDING INTEREST.

5. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT UNDER ANY FORESEEABLE

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CIRCUMSTANCES POLAND WILL REPRESENT AN ENORMOUS DRAIN ON THE RUSSIAN POSITION. WE ARE IN A SENSE IN A NO-LOSE SITUATION.

6. TO TAKE FIRST THE MOST OPTIMISTIC HYPOTHESIS, FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE POLISH PEOPLE: IF JARUZELSKI MAKES GOOD ON HIS PROMISE OF RETURNING THE COUNTRY TO A REFORM, CONSENSUS COURSE, WITH A SOLIDARITY THAT MAY BE CURBED BUT NOT EXTINGUISHED, POLAND COULD BE A DANGEROUS EXAMPLE TO THE OTHER EE'S. THE REFORM MOMENTUM WOULD LIKELY GATHER STRENGTH GRADUALLY AGAIN AND CARRY THE COUNTRY FORWARD IN A MANNER THAT COULD BE ATTRACTIVE, IF IT WORKED ECONOMICALLY AS WELL AS POLITICALLY, TO THE OTHER RUSSIAN CLIENTS.

7. A LESS FAVORABLE VIEW WOULD BE THAT JARUZELSKI EITHER DOES NOT INTEND TO LIVE UP TO HIS PROMISES, AND THEY ARE INTENDED TO MISLEAD WHILE NORMALIZATION TAKES HOLD, OR THAT HE IS IN GOOD FAITH BUT THE MARTIAL LAW DYNAMICS WILL INEVITABLY CARRY NORMALIZATION INTO A RISING SPIRAL OF REPRESSION. SUCH A PROCESS WOULD MAKE POLAND A DIFFICULT COUNTRY TO GOVERN -- NOT THAT IT HAS EVER BEEN EASY. SOLIDARITY MIGHT FORMALLY DISAPPEAR, BUT THE INDUSTRIAL WORK FORCE WOULD REMAIN DEEPLY DISAFFECTED. THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE WOULD BE CORRESPONDINGLY NEGATIVE IN THE EVENT, AS WOULD SEEM LIKELY, THE GOVERNMENT INCREASED PRESSURES ON PRIVATE FARMERS. THE POLAND THAT WOULD EVOLVE IN SUCH A PATTERN WOULD HARDLY BE A GROWING ASSET TO THE RUSSIANS. IT MIGHT BE PINNED DOWN TIGHT ENOUGH IN MILITARY-SECURITY TERMS, BUT IT WOULD BE A HUGE POLITICAL LIABILITY.

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8. A STILL LESS FAVORABLE POSSIBILITY FOR THE POLISH PEOPLE IS RUSSIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE EVENT JARUZELSKI, OR A SUCCESSOR, PROVED UNABLE TO HOLD POLAND IN PLACE WITH POLISH MEANS ALONE. THE RESULT IN THIS CASE, A VIRTUAL OCCUPATION REGIME WITH A MUCH LARGER, PERMANENT RUSSIAN GARRISON THAN THE CURRENT ONE, MIGHT HOLD POLAND DOWN AND PROTECT THE RUSSIAN POLITICAL-MILITARY EQUITIES IN POLAND AND GERMANY, BUT THE COSTS, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY,

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WOULD BE HIGH INDEED. THE MILITARY ARITHMETIC, ON THE CENTRAL FRONT WOULD BE ALTERED, FOR ONE THING.

9. THE THREE SCENARIOS WOULD THUS, IN THEIR VARIOUS WAYS AND IN VARYING DEGREE, SEVERELY WEAKEN THE RUSSIAN POSITION. (MY OWN HUNCH IS THAT SOME VARIANT OF THE SECOND IS THE MOST LIKELY.) TO REPEAT, THIS IS NO BAD POSITION FOR THE U.S. TO BE IN. THE QUESTION IS HOW TO MAXIMIZE RUSSIAN LOSSES AT LEAST COST TO OURSELVES. LOOKING AT THE THREE POSSIBLE SCENARIOS, WHICH DO WE SEE AS THE MOST USEFUL TO US, AND WHAT CAN AND SHOULD WE DO TO PROMOTE IT?

10. THE WELFARE OF THE POLISH PEOPLE, THE PROMOTION OF THEIR RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES, MUST PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN ANY REVIEW OF U.S. OPTIONS. IF THIS IS SO, THE FIRST SCENARIO IS LOGICALLY THE PREFERRED ONE. THE QUESTIONS THEN ARE: DOES JARUZELSKI REALLY MEAN IT WHEN HE SAYS HE WANTS TO RETURN THE COUNTRY TO A REFORM COURSE; WILL HE SURVIVE POLITICALLY, AND CAN HE DELIVER; AND HOW SHOULD WE ALIGN OURSELVES TO ENCOURAGE THE PROCESS?

11. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO TELL YET IF JARUZELSKI MEANS IT AND WILL SURVIVE AND CAN DELIVER. EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS THAT THE RETURN-TO-REFORM PROMISE IS THE CLASSICAL DISORIENTATION PLAY. OR THAT, GIVING HIM THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT, HE WILL BE FORCED BY THE OBJECTIVE DIFFICULTIES OF THE SITUATION HE HAS HIMSELF CREATED TO TIGHTEN THE SCREWS. OR THAT HE IS TRANSITIONAL, AND THE POLISH HUSAKS ARE IN THE WINGS READY TO MOVE ON TO CENTER STAGE WHEN HE HAS DONE THE PACIFICATION JOB WHICH ONLY THE ARMED FORCES CAN ENSURE.

12. IT MAY LOOK FROM THE OUTSIDE--AND THAT MAY BE THE BEST OBSERVATION BASE -- THAT JARUZELSKI IS SIMPLY DOING THE POLISH PARTY'S AND THE RUSSIAN' DIRTY WORK FOR THEM. THAT IS PROBABLY THE MOST PRUDENT ASSUMPTION BUT IT IS STILL NOT ENTIRELY PROVEN. THE ROLE OF THE PARTY UNDER JARUZELSKI IS UNCLEAR. HE IS A PARTY MAN, AS WELL AS A SOLDIER, AND IT CAN HARDLY BE HIS INTENTION TO HAVE THE MILITARY COMPLETELY USURP THE PARTY. YET THE FACT REMAINS, AS WE HAVE ALL NOTED, THAT THE PARTY AS SUCH HAS BEEN A MINOR PLAYER IN THE MARTIAL LAW SITUATION. SIMILARLY, ON THE POINT OF

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JARUZELSKI'S RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS, THERE IS ROOM FOR SPECULATION. HE IS, I AM SURE, WHOLLY COMMITTED TO THE RUSSIAN CONNECTION ON THE LARGE, STRATEGIC-POLITICAL ISSUES ULTIMATELY INVOLVING GERMANY. BUT HE IS A POLE, AND POLISH NATIONALISM RUNS DEEP. JARUZELSKI GAVE ME THE IMPRESSION, IN MY SEVERAL MEETINGS WITH HIM OVER THE PAST YEAR, OF BEING COMMITTED TO A PROCESS OF CHANGE IN POLISH POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LIFE. I WOULD NOT ENTIRELY DISMISS HIS CLAIM THAT HE ACTED ON DEC 13 TO PREVENT A DRIFT TO CIVIL WAR, AND THE INFERENCE THAT HE SAW HIMSELF ACTING IN POLISH NATIONAL INTERESTS, SINCE CIVIL WAR WOULD INEVITABLY MEAN FOREIGN INTERVENTION

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13. THE IMMEDIATE PRACTICAL TEST OF JARUZELSKI'S INTENTIONS, BUT NOT NECESSARILY THE FINAL ONE, IS THE CURRENT SOUNDINGS BETWEEN THE VATICAN AND THE POLISH CHURCH ON THE ONE HAND AND THE POLISH AUTHORITIES ON THE OTHER. IT IS CLEAR FROM MY RECENT MEETING WITH GLEMP, AND FROM HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS, THAT HE IS GOING ON THE WORKING ASSUMPTION THAT THERE ARE POSSIBILITIES FOR MOVEMENT ON JARUZELSKI'S PART, ALTHOUGH HE IS REALISTIC ON THE DIFFICULTIES. PRESUMABLY THE VATICAN IS OF LIKE MIND, OR IS WOULD NOT HAVE CONSIDERED IT WORTHWHILE TO SEND POGGI. BOTH THE VATICAN AND GLEMP CLEARLY PREFER A POLISH SOLUTION, WITH ALL ITS DEFECTS, TO A RUSSIAN.

14. I RECOGNIZE THAT USG INTERESTS AND VATICAN/ POLISH CHURCH INTERESTS ARE NOT NECESSARILY THE SAME, BUT THEIR VIEWS ARE A FACTOR OF SOME WEIGHT WITH, AMONGH OTHERS, THE WEST EUROPEANS.

15. EVEN IF GLEMP'S AND THE VATICAN'S CURRENT EFFORTS ARE UNPRODUCTIVE, HOWEVER, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD PAUSE BEFORE TAKING FURTHER PUNITIVE MEASURES AGAINST JARUZELSKI. WE WERE RIGHT TO ZAP HIM. I THINK WE SHOULD NOW WAIT TO SEE WHERE HE GOES FROM HERE, AND IT MAY TAKE SOME TIME TO GET A LINE ON

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IT. I ALSO BELIEVE WE SHOULD HOLD OUT SOME CARROT TO HIM IF HE SHOWS SIGNS OF RELAXING THE GRIP ON THE COUNTRY IN WAYS THAT WE CONSIDER IMPORTANT. WE HAVE GIVEN HIM THE STICK, WHICH HE DESERVES, BUT IF IT IS ONLY THE STICK, HE MAY NOT HAVE MUCH CHOICE. HOW MUCH CARROT, AND HOW IT IS DANGLED, IS A MATTER FOR DISCUSSION, BUT I THINK WE SHOULD NOT DISMISS THE OPTION, HOWEVER GREAT OUR SENSE OF OUTRAGE.

16. IN ADVANCING THE THOUGHTS ABOVE I AM AS OUTRAGED AS ANYONE BY WHAT JARUZELSKI HAS DONE-- PERHAPS MORE OUTRAGED THAN MOST SINCE I HAVE SEEN POLISH EVOLUTION CLOSE UP THIS PAST YEAR AND KNOW PERSONALLY MANY OF THE PEOPLE INVOLVED, SOME NOW IN DETENTION.

17. I ALSO HAVE IN MIND THE RELATIONSHIP OF POLAND TO OUR INTERESTS IN WESTERN EUROPE. I BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR OUR PURPOSES TO PROCEED WITH OUR OWN TNF SYSTEMS, OR TO BRING ABOUT THE REMOVAL OF THE RUSSIAN SYSTEMS. FROM WHERE I AM, IT MIGHT SEEM THAT POLAND, AND THE LARGER IMPLICATIONS OF WESTERN ATTITUDES TOWARD MOSCOW, COULD HAVE, PARADOXICALLY IT WOULD SEEM, A DIVISIVE EFFECT IN THE ALLIANCE. THERE WILL BE A HOST OF FACTORS I AM UNAWARE OF, BUT WE WILL DOUBTLESS WISH TO CONTINUE TO PLAY POLAND CAREFULLY WITH LARGER INTERESTS IN MIND. FOR THIS REASON ALSO, THEREFORE, I SUGGEST A PAUSE IN ZAP, WITH THE TIP OF THE CARROT SLIGHTLY EXTENDED IF CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT. IF IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT THERE IS NO PRACTICAL HOPE OF IMPROVEMENT IN JARUZELSKI OR ANY SUCCESSOR, OUR OPTION TOWARD FURTHER PUNITIVE MEASURES IS STILL OPEN BUT, IT SHOULD THINK, ON A SURER BASIS SO FAR AS WESTERN EUROPE IS CONCERNED.

18. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.  
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END OF MESSAGE

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